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"nothingness/ in words enclose": Supplementarity and the "Veil"
of Language in Samuel Beckett's Murphy and Watt
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Samuel Beckett has asserted that language is a "veil" in which he must
"bore one hole after another ... , until what lurks behind it- be it something
or nothing- begins to seep through." This thesis employs Derrida's assertion
that language involves the play of differance and the supplementarity of the
sign. Since the supplement, in Derrida's words, "fills and marks a
determined lack," language calls attention to the gap of nothingness already
present in the play of differance. Murphy and Watt present both the desire
for the "semantic succour" of the veil and the awareness- more fully
developed in Beckett's later work- that, despite a continued wish to enclose
nothingness, the veil must be continually rent. This dynamic is thematically
and linguistically apparent in these two works. Thus Beckett's characters may
not enclose nothingness, but by continuing to "go on" with words they may
find value in continuing the process.
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Language in Beckett's Early Novels

who may tell the tale
of the old man?
weigh absence in a scale?
mete want with a span?
the sum assess
of the world's woes?
nothingness
in words enclose ?1
The limitations of language are a preoccupation throughout Samuel
Beckett's work, especially in his fiction. With an unsettling circularity,
language in his works reveals within itself a dislocation that disrupts his
protagonists' quests for either origin or telos. Beckett's characters seek a silent
stasis, the place at which the self finds relief as self-identical whole and/ or as
nothingness. When they speak a word, they hope for completion or relief
(described in Watt as "semantic succour" [W 83]) which will enable an
ensuing silence, the end at last. But this relief is not achieved; instead the
yearning for silence paradoxically necessitates further use of language. All we
have are "the old words, the old credentials" which are incapable of enclosing
the nothing/everything of existence (W 85). Only exhaustion in the absence
of exhaustiveness ends the quest for this origin, and we are left with
language. Beckett's characters seem trapped in a vicious circle. Yet their

1 Samuel Beckett, Watt, p.247. Hereafter, citations will appear parenthetically in the text of the
essay, denoted by the abbreviation W.

2

impetus to think, tell, speak, or write may not be entirely futile: the process
exposes the inability of language to enclose, thereby revealing the gap or
dislocation through which these inescapable words can continue to produce
meaning.
The phrase "nothingness/ in words enclose," epitomizes the
elusiveness of meaning in Beckett's scheme of language. The final question
posed in the poem is a rhetorical one, which denies the ability of enclosure
while simultaneously maintaining an implicit assertion, "Perhaps I can."
Beckett's characters (creations of language) are doomed to continue speaking/
writing/ thinking in language. The task of reaching nothingness is only
futile when "words" and "tale" are equated with "scale" and "span." I will
argue in this paper that such measurements cannot adequately "mete" or
"weigh" the irreducibility of Beckett's surds. The surd, an irrational number,
becomes an important figure in his world, a trope for his characters, whose
behavior clashes with societal norms and whose logical exercises retain a taint
of irrationality. The persistence of the surd mirrors Beckett's view of art: he
castigates those who find "the irreducibility of pi" to be "an offence against the
Deity."2 In this sense, an enclosure in words seems to be the insistence to
round off, to reduce and rein in existence as one would represent pi as 3.14.
Beckett, "Bram van Velde," p. 125. He targets the general history of painting, in which he sees a
progressive movement toward "less exclusive relations between representer and representee," a
movement which ignores the inherent failure in art and its attempts at pure mediation.
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Thus attempts to enclose underscore the failure of language, its
exclusion of those elements which do not conform to the systematic order:
the "nothingness" resists rigid enclosure.

Nothingness remains accessible,

however, if we view language not as a tool that neatly encapsulates and
transmits discrete entities and prelinguistic "meanings," but rather as that
field that comprises the play of signs where meaning is constituted and which
thus includes the gap of "nothingness" within itself. In these terms, one is
not merely doomed to language, but may instead accept it as a condition of
meaning.

One cannot forsake language entirely; silence is only a temporary

break in the circle of language: even the final curtain of Waiting for Godot
that silences Vladimir and Estragon leaves us with the intimation that
tomorrow holds more of the same "nothing to be done."3

The function of

language, therefore, is not enclosure, but rather a process or movement
which destabilizes the binary oppositions of presence/absence, inside/outside,
and sign/meaning. By continuing the process, one finds that limit is also
limen, and it is at this middle ground that we obtain a fleeting glimpse of
Beckett's Nothing.

Beckett, Waiting for Godot, p.7. The cited phrase is the first line spoken in the play: it is Estragon's
lament on troubles with his boot. Cyclical repetitions (albeit with incremental variants) throughout
the play, as well as the ending ("Let's go. They do not move." [60)), allow us to presume that tomorrow
holds more of the same. Yet it may perhaps be the day that Godot comes, or the day that the
(umbilical) cord doesn't break, so that the two may hang themselves.
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"To elicit something from nothing required a certain skill"4
Beginnings: Beckett and Derrida
Beginnings, origins, are of central concern in Beckett. As he writes in
his first novel, Murphy, "In the beginning was the pun."5 By parodying the
well-known assertion of the Gospel of John, "In the beginning was the
Word," Beckett here challenges the originary metaphysical presence implicit
in the Biblical phrase. His challenge evokes complexities analagous to those
found in Derrida's concept of language. Drawing on Saussure, Derrida argues
that the nature of the sign is arbitrary, i.e., that no positive foundation links
signifier and signified. The division between signifier and signified, he
argues, enacts (and is enacted by) the play of differance- a deferral along a
chain of signifiers constituted by their difference. The signified cannot be
entirely divided from a signifier, because such a division would allow for a
prelinguistic concept, or "transcendental signified."6 The pun, Beckett's
originary condition of language, is one example of the complex division. In
Murphy's remark on "the stout porter" (M 139), we may infer either a draught
at the pub or a portly valet. The signifier "porter" is not fully divided from
either signified (it can refer to these things, although this connection is of
Watt, p.77.
Beckett, Murphy, p.65. Hereafter, citations will appear parenthetically in the text, denoted by the
abbreviation M. Also, in the beginning of Watt, Hackett and the Nixons discuss birth and childhood as
Watt appears, in a sense, to be born onto the tram-station platform. For a perceptive discussion of
birth/maternal motifs, see Leslie Hill, Beckett's Fiction: In Different Words.
6 Derrida, Postilions, pp.18-20.
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arbitrary origin), and yet it is not irremediably attached to one signified, since
it may refer to both. It may conduct this play of meaning because neither a
beer nor a servant is present to the reader /listener of the word. We have only
the presentation of the sign.
As a substitute that occupies the place of the thing itself, the sign
consequently points to the thing while simultaneously announcing its
absence. In its presentation as a substitute for the thing-itself to which it
refers (as well as for the eidos of this thing), the sign functions as supplement.
This notion of supplementarity is Janus-faced: it announces itself as addition
or surplus, but also as compensation for a lack.7 Derrida notes, "the
supplement occupies the middle point between total absence and total
presence. The play of substitution fills and marks a determined lack."8 By its
supplementarity, language is placed in that middle ground that is such a
problematic no-man's-land for Beckett. Derrida's original French
appropriately provides a wordplay on "marks" and "lack": "marque un
manque determine."9 The similarity of "marque" and "manque" emphasizes
the necessary use of a "something" to describe "nothing" as absence.
"Manque" itself is in fact a marque which points to the manque that is
determined. Furthermore, "determine" also points to a sense of
7 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p.289.
8 Of Grammatology, p.157.
9 Derrida, De la Grammatologie, p.226.
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determination on the part of the lack: the unattached signifier resolutely
wanders in search of a home.10 This "lack" is analagous to that which I
termed above the "dislocation" or "gap" inherent in language. We see that
there is no simple absence or presence because the lack evades us as it moves
endlessly along the chain of signifiers, a movement which can always turn
back on itself and leave us where we began (a place which, however, remains
a non-origin). Thus the movement of language spins us in a circle, yet the
circle is never wholly complete.
I have chosen Murphy and Watt as the focus of this study because the
two novels serve as a transition between the "omnipotence" of Beckett's
predecessor, Joyce, and the literature of silence, failure, and impotence that
dominates Beckett's subsequent work.11 We may wonder, like the narrator of

Watt, "what was this pursuit of meaning, in this indifference to meaning?"
(W 75). At this stage of Beckett's fiction, still moderately conventional in its
manipulations of third-person narration, indifference has not yet
overwhelmed pursuit. The protagonist beomes resigned to the sense of
Murphy, p.5. Murphy asserts to Neary that life is "a wandering to find a home."
Beckett, in an interview with Israel Shenker, dissociates himself from Joyce: "Joyce was the superb
manipulator of material[ ... ]. He's tending toward omniscience and omnipotence as an artist. I'm
working with impotence, ignorance" ("Moody Man of Letters"). Ihab Hassan, in The Dismemberment of
Orpheus and The Literature of Silence, uses the term "the literature of silence" to name Beckett's mode.
Beckett also posits the artist's "fidelity to failure" as the only capacity for art ("Bram van Velde"
125). Hassan and Hugh Kenner also remark that Beckett's style marks a tum from Joyce's seemingly
all-encompassing structures: Hassan asserts, "art becomes a 'closed field' and the total verbal
competence of Joyce yields to the thorough 'incompetence' of Beckett" (The Dismemberment of Orpheus
210). Kenner lucidly and more thoroughly develops a similar point in The Stoic Comedians, pp.67-82.
10
11
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impotence caused by the constraints of language (the necessary absence of a
transcendental signified), yet he continues on with a newly found awareness
of the possibility opened by the very condition (the gap) that is the source of
impotence. These novels begin Beckett's engagements with the conditions of
language, those conditions that spawn the narration and un-narration that
his characters themselves undertake (thus we may perhaps call them the
undertakers of language) more directly in the Trilogy.
In these two early novels, language appears as an imperfect form of
restriction and finitude (language qua "scale" or "span") in a world of chaos.
Yet when language (and therefore the narrative and the self that are
constituted in language) is eased of this burden by its users, Beckett accesses
the relative freedom that arises from recognizing the use of language as a
"coming and a going" (W 45, 131-2) rather than as an enclosure .12 As he
remarked in a 1937 letter to Axel Kaun:
more and more my own language appears to me like a veil that
must be torn apart in order to get at the things (or the Nothingness)
behind it.[ ... ] To bore one hole after another in it, until what lurks
behind it-be it something or nothing- begins to seep through13
Watt determines that at Knott's house, "all was a coming and a going." This pertains to language in
the sense of active movement in a fashion analagous to Derrida's concept of differance as a deferred
movement along an interconnected web of signifiers, in which difference marks a division and
metonymic similarity marks a connection. Also relevant are my previous remarks on the complex
division simultaneous with the arbitrary connection of signifier and signified in the sign. As we will
see, Beckett plays out this coming and going in the interstitial areas so prominent in Watt, as well as in
the middle-ground "gulf," the point of confluence of "meeting and parting," in Murphy.
13 Beckett, Disjecta, pp.171-72. Beckett remarks on a disdain for English that caused him to turn to
French after writing Watt. However, his comments also pertain to language in general.
12
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Beckett's dissatisfaction with language, however, necessitates less a tearing
apart than a foregrounding of the materiality of this veil. By exposing the
capacity of language to obfuscate, Beckett draws attention to the ways in which
a peremptory enclosure of meaning necessarily breeds falsification. As I have
already noted, language always already contains certain gaps or holes, the
interstices between the corning and going in the play of signifiers and
signifieds. An emphasis on the materiality of the sign therefore also calls
attention to the holes, through which we may apprehend the Nothingness.14
Corning and going, then, is the only way for language to function for
Beckett: the "veil" of language must continually weave and unravel, tear and
be mended, so that it cannot serve as an opaque barrier. A static language that
relies on metaphysical presence engenders a binary opposition of
inside/ outside which is "doomed to fail, doomed, doomed to fail" (W 44).
This vision of language leaves us with a facile Cartesian dualism or the
unrealistic Realist novel with its blind facade of an omniscient narrator.IS I
Stephen Connor has also commented on this letter of Beckett's. He notes, "Beckett is not looking for a
new language which is more supplely responsive to the task of representing a higher reality. He wants
instead to have done with a language because it is inherently falsifying. The problem is that one has
to stay inside language even as one tries to sabotage it." (Samuel Beckett 17). Connor's own analysis of
Beckett's novels demonstrates that repetition effectively undermines authority and enables the works,
as read and re-read, to say something new. Thus being "inside language" poses no problem because that
iterability which enables language to be used and re-used includes its own capacity for self-sabotage.
My present essay addresses the ways (other than repetition) in which Beckett's novels betray a
resigned awareness that one need not "have done" with language, that foregrounding its problems frees
one from its supposed constraints.
15 Derrida notes that such an inside/ outside opposition persists in the metaphysics of presence, most
notably in Husserlian phenomenology. This mode of thought views language as expression, i.e., as the
14
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will examine the failures Murphy and Watt face as each attempts his version
of an inside/outside world in the quest for presence, and I will also examine
the continuation enabled in each novel by the recognition of this failure of
logocen trism.
Arsene's mention of Watt "having oscillated all his life" (W 41) could
well serve as a description of many of Beckett's characters. This oscillation
also appears in language in its iterability, the repetition of sameness.16 Just as
the characters seek freedom in the fixed course of an oscillation (Murphy
rocking in the chair, Watt on the railway), so the constraint of the habit of the
"old credentials" of language is used to fill the gap in the circle and lead to
meaning, however provisional or illusory.
In no case is there a "prior system" (M 183) on which a monism of self

exterior manifestation and transmission of a privileged, present, interior thought- a "transcendental
signified" (Positions 30-34). Such expression would require perfect mediation of meaning, a perfection
notably absent among the shrunken conaria, poor hearing, mumbled speech, and short attention spans of
Murphy's and Watt's worlds. As such, the project of language would be "doomed to fail." However, by
directing our attention to the play of language, the coming and going at work in liminal areas, rather
than focusing on the dichotomy of inside/outside, we may find a use for words in spite of the absence of
the Word. Thomas Trezise, in his book Into the Breach, offers a full analysis on ways in which
Beckett's fictional and linguistic concerns contrast with the models of Husserlian phenomenology and
existential humanism. Trezise works with a more philosophically sophisticated model of expression
than the simplification I offer here. The book charts Beckett's similarity to thinkers such as
Blanchot, Bataille, Derrida, and Deleuze, and reaches its sharpest focus in Trezise's analysis of the
Trilogy.
16 Derrida, "Signature Event Context," pp.179-83. This itcrability is a repetition that also marks
difference. In order for a sign to function, it must be repeatable in different contexts, which are
limitless. And for these repeatable signs, "the very iterability which constituted their identity does
not permit them to be a unity that is identical to itself" (183). Stephen Connor, in Samuel Beckett,
(especially Chapter One, "Difference and Repetition"), provides extensive background on Derrida's
writings on iterability, and ways in which this pertains to repetition in Beckett's work.

10

or God or a dualism of mind/body (mind/world, inside/outside) can rest.17
A subtle recognition of this can be found in Beckett's fragmentary, resigned
admission, "never been properly born," included among the addenda to Watt
(W 248).18 Separation from the origin is originary, hence the "gap" or
"dislocation" inherent in language: we begin with puns and the danger of
equivocation rather than with the unity of the Word. The supplement,
which as previously noted "fills and marks a determined lack," points to, and
takes the place of, this gap of nothingness that demarcates the absence of a
meaning. Thus the absence we find is not pure absence, but the trace of a
presence that has always been trace. As Arsene tells Watt, "the coming is in
the shadow of the going and the going is in the shadow of the coming, that is
the annoying part about it" (W 57). The expression of annoyance
humorously undercuts the poetic aphorism which precedes it. Yet, as we find
throughout Beckett's work, derisive humor accompanies a trenchant insight.
Yes, it is truly annoying in that it denies "semantic succor," yet the coming
and going is also the condition for meaning.
Both Murphy and Watt stumble along in the quest for the home of
17 Murphy believes everything exists in his mind before being inscribed in the stars or elsewhere in the
universe.
18 That its "incorporation" has been "prevented" - as a footnoted disclaimer informs us regarding the
list of addenda- demonstrates that this phrase itself has been denied a proper birth of the word. The
addendum which follows it, "the foetal soul is full grown" (W 248), hints further that this hoped-for
transcendence is not linked to a true origin, but rather achieves a form of presence only in a problematic
incarnation. Cf. Pozzo's view of the virtual simultanaeity of birth and death in Act II of Waiting for
Godot: "one day we were born, one day we shall die, the same day, the same second" (57b).
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origin or telos. Each finds frustration in the elusiveness of meaning, the
elusiveness of the end. However, in the breakdown of the inside/outside
paradigm, each makes the move, however reluctantly, into the coming and
going demanded of a linguistic being, and this creates a fair measure of
freedom and a fleeting glimpse of a telos or end. The inside/outside
opposition remains a source of tension for both Murphy and Watt. The noman's land between the two poles is problematic in both texts, but it is the
place to which each feels compelled to continually return.

Murphy the "Median" and Absent Center

Murphy is a "novel" in which the structures of sameness and
repetition imposed by society seek to constrict the chaos of life and the
wandering of the self in its quest for the refreshing unity of home, of
wholeness at the origin. Categories and binary oppositions are foregrounded
only to reveal their inherent inadequacy. Closure and neatly delineated
categories prove impossible to attain in a world that is a "mess of chaos" (M
65). Mediation is thus rendered problematic in the novel, a problematization
manifest both thematically and in the demonstrations of the inadequacy of
language to represent the chaos. Yet Beckett suggests that the point of
language may not simply be representation, and we can reconcile ourselves to
a world of surds by properly refocusing our attention on the middle-ground
rather than on the extremes that never seal themselves shut.
The opening sentences, alluding to Ecclesiastes, establish the central
concerns of the novel: "The sun shone, having no alternative, on the
nothing new. Murphy sat out of it, as though he were free." Immediately we
see the binary opposition of inside/outside, a paradigm in which only the
semblance of freedom may be achieved. It is Murphy versus the exterior
world of "Quid pro quo," to which he feels he does not belong. Later, we are
informed that "I am not of the big world, I am of the little world," is
Murphy's chosen refrain (M 178).
12
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Cracks soon appear in this model of big world/little world, and
wecannot safely place Murphy in either. He cannot be ensconced wholly in
the little world of his mind if he can communicate this refrain to those who
reside in the big world. Also, we are told that there "was indeed a Miss
Counihan" with whose body Murphy's own body had been involved (M 6).
Murphy feels himself "split in two, a body and a mind" (M 109), and therefore
such interaction may not involve the "I" (mind) of his refrain. His love for
Celia and preference for ginger "divide him" from the purity of his solely
intellectual love. The divided self seeks unification, and there must be a
mediation which makes this possible.
Murphy's recollection of his parting conversation with his former
theological mentor, Neary, is particularly telling:
'"Murphy, all life is figure and ground.'
'But a wandering to find home,' said Murphy." (M 4)
Neary, at various times a Newtonian or Pythagorean, seeks to impose a sort
of mathematical/ geometrical model on life: he envisions a world of binary
opposites in which the face can stand out against the "big blooming buzzing
confusion" (M 4). Murphy, however, resists the constraints of figure and
ground. He seeks a home, for which coming alive in his mind in the
rocking-chair serves as a temporary substitute: we learn of the movement
"astir in his mind, in the freedom of light and dark that did not clash, nor

14

alternate, nor fade nor lighten except to their communion" (M 9). Although
this communion seems temporarily possible in the "dark zone" (M 112) of
Murphy's mind, it is a unity noticeably absent elsewhere in the novel.19
This is underscored most obviously by the division between Murphy's
own body and mind, his "unredeemed split self" (M 188). Other prominent
discrete, unconnected entities are the characters who seek Murphy to fill a
void they feel within themselves.20 Something is needed to mediate between
self and self, between self and other: a something that remains elusive.
Murphy's connection to Mercury offers a partial explanation. Murphy
remarks, "Mercury, god of thieves, planet par excellence and mine, has no
fixed colour" (M 31). Mercury is also a messenger to the gods, an
intermediary, but his fleetness, stealth, and inability to be fixed demonstrate
the fleeting, tenuous nature of mediation: he belongs to neither Olympus
nor earth.

Mercury's Roman name, Hermes, also hints at the barriers to

connection, and is echoed when "Murphy's mind pictured itself as a large
hollow sphere, hermetically closed to the universe without" (M 107). We
thus have a problem in which the essence that encloses also serves as go19 Murphy seems to find such unity in the patients at the Magdalen Mental Mercyscat asylum, whose
condition "psychiatrists called exile," but whom Murphy finds "escaped from a colossal fiasco" (M
178). By emphasizing the wandering of the self, Murphy implies that each of us is an exile from the
point of birth, seeking escape to the peace of home. That the patients vent "pain, rage, despair"
indicates that they have not achieved such unity and peace any more than Murphy and the other
characters have (M 179).
20 "Murphy then is actually being needed by five people outside himself" (M 202). Neary, Miss
Counihan, Wylie, Cooper, and Celia are the five who seek to redeem their lives by seeking him.
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between. This mirrors the contradicition inherent in the linguistic sign, in
which the signifier and signified are irremediably divided, yet remain two
sides of the same coin. The spacing of differance demarcates the differences
that ostensibly "hermetically" seal signifieds from each other (thereby making
each discrete signifier recognizable), yet a sameness exists (a dissipation of
hermetic seal) that connects the signifieds, thereby enabling the movement of
signifieds along the chain and the possibility of signification. Such
contradictions are impossible in a world of binary oppositions: Murphy
cannot mark an inside/outside, language cannot be merely meaning/sign.
Simultaneous division and unification is only possible if all is a coming and a
going.
Murphy's name also suggests both "morph" (form), and, more
importantly, "Morpheus" (god of dreams- the state between consciousness
and unconsciousness). As with body and mind, signifier and signified,
mediation is rendered problematic because of the inseparability of form and
content. Murphy's self, "improved out of all knowledge" (105), resides
presumably only within the mind, the self described in section six. Yet the
tautological "Murphy was Murphy" (17) calls the materiality of form into this
equation of sameness that is differentiation.21 Coinciding in the signifier
Sylvie Henning emphasizes the difference that is implied here: "It appears from the equation M=M
that Mis not, in fact, self identical. The copula, indeed, marks an internal difference" (Beckett's
Critical Complicity 33). The identity principle, however, marks the sameness of the form "Murphy"

21
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"Murphy," the interiority of mind is indistinguishable from the exteriority of
body. The attempt to divide these is impossible, and if the corning and going
is imposed into an artificial binary opposition, all middle ground is erased
and mediation is irnpossible.22 As with all transcendent, magical
transformations, "Only God could do that. Let there be Heaven in the midst
of the waters, let it divide the waters from the waters" (M 176).
The dream-realm of Morpheus also remains problematic. In Celia's
absence, Murphy tries to move this intermediate realm into an opposition
with thought: "If only he had been able to think of her, he would not have
needed to dream of her" (M 189). Dream is supplement for thought and for
physical presence; he mentions his physical and emotional "susceptibility to
Celia" (M 179). His "need" continues "to divide him" (M 138, 179) because
he clings to the view of thought in his mind as originary presence (M 106). It
is this maintained belief in originary presence that continues to divide him,
and he eventually reaches the point at which his mind can conjure only
"lines and colours evoking nothing,'' since he quests for a presence rather
than embracing the process of signification (M 252). Like the "imperturbable
(Henning's "M" term). This paradox demonstrates that terms such as same/different and
internal/external continually slip from our grasp.
22 We see a similar problem as Murphy differentiates between the "self whom he loved" and "the self
whom he hated" (M 194). Within the "Murphy was Murphy" equation, the (interior) self he loves is
the same as the (exterior) self he hates. He hopes to overcome this contradiction in the dark zone of
his mind: "forms becoming and crumbling into the fragments of a new becoming, without love or hate"
(M 112). Yet this "Matrix of surds" is only a temporary solution: its "freedom of indifference, the
indifference of freedom" (M 105) cannot be reconciled to the difference, the differance necessary to
engagement with the world and with language. Murphy and Endon appear in the same way.
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negligence of Providence to provide" (M 21), originary presence remains
resolutely unreachable. Yet Murphy persists in the opposition "between the
life from which he had turned away and the life of which he had no
experience, except as he hoped inchoately within himself" (M 176). And "he
could not fail to side with the latter" (M 176). Only the "superfine chaos" (M
253), the rapturous explosion into the unity of death can lead him to this
latter realm of presence, the origin andtelos at which "his body was quiet" (M
253).
Intermediary settings of time and place in the novel also emphasize
the inability to fix or connect people and events. Murphy's mew faces
northeast (M 1). His accident occurs at "foredawn" (M 252), and the funeral
is at "forenoon" (M 254). The novel ends at dusk (M 282). The M.M.M. is
situated "on the boundary of two counties" (M 157), and Murphy's body is
deposited just barely on the side of one of these (M 260). These times and
places are relational rather than absolute. Such artificial constructions
inevitably fail to fix experience, and even within their own systems the
delineations are often vague. Beckett's careful emphasis on these
posi tionings serves to underscore their uselessness and the bankruptcy of the
language of realism.23
Ihab Hassan notes that events in Murphy are more "precisely placed and dated" than those in any of
Beckett's other works (The Dismembennent of Orpheus 222). I tend to agree with Ruby Cohn that such
"punctilious precision" actually "ridicules time and place" (Back to Beckett 55). Time and place are
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Characters in the novel likewise resist rigid encapsulation. Cooper, the
intermediary manservant (who cannot achieve the intermediary position of
sitting)24, meets with his confidants at dusk (M 198); he also collects
Murphy's ashes at dusk (M 273). He is an "analphabet," poorly educated in
language, so he resorts to facial gestures of "the finest shades of irresolution"
to avoid misquotation (M 205). Furthermore, he moves between Wylie and
Miss Counihan "with the beautiful indifference of a shuttle" (M 198).25
As Neary, Wylie, and Miss Counihan proceed in their combined quest
for Murphy, they toast "the absentee" ("a tactful description of Murphy") and
make a feeble attempt to delineate their relationship:
"Remember there is no triangle, however obtuse,
but the circumference of some circle passes through its wretched
vertices ....
"Our medians," said Wylie, "or whatever the hell they are, meet
in Murphy."
"Outside us," said Neary. "Outside us." (M 213-14)
The medians intersect only in the center, but the center is absent, it is
recognized as relational constructs rather than absolutes, and even the precise descriptions show that
events are often relegated to the boundaries of these constructs. In a somewhat different view, John
Fletcher recognizes Murphy as "a parody of the traditional novel" (The Novels of Samuel Beckett 41),
yet he does not connect this view to his emphasis on the novel's apparent "accuracy" of time and place.
(Samuel Beckett 38-55). Linda Ben-Zvi remarks that all the exhaustive detail of the novel (time and
place, Celia's measurements, etc.) combines to "indicate how easily facts suffice for truth in life"
(Samuel Beckett 45).
24 "Cooper never sat, his acathisia was deep-seated and long standing" (M 119). Again, humor
accompanies insight, while resisting rigidity. Stephen Connor cites this passage as an example of the
undermining of metaphor in the novel, thereby renouncing binary oppositions of sign/meaning in favor
of the paradoxes and differance inherent in language (Samuel Beckett 25).
25 Cf. Beckett, Molloy, p.132-33. Moran describes his process: "But I write them [the lines] all the
same, and with a firm hand weaving inexorably back and forth and devouring my page with the
indifference of a shuttle." As with the intermediary Cooper, the medium of language is flawed: the
perceived "indifference" does not render an immaculate mediation.
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"outside" the circle.26 Their medians cannot meet outside of them without
this point of intersection. Yet this originary presence or center can offer a
compromised connection. When Murphy dies, his ashes are scattered: "the
body, mind and soul of Murphy were freely distributed" (M 275). This
dissemination, both unity and dispersal, allows the unity of the originary
presence to be suffused through all elements, reach all medians. And the
characters can find some measure of solace in the quest they have made
throughout the novel. As Ihab Hassan explains, "The need of Murphy's mind
is to abolish itself; the need of all his friends is to make of his absence, his
disappearance, a presence. Both needs are ironic equivalents" (The

Dismemberment of Orpheus 222). As I have remarked, each seeks the unity
of presence and absence, origin and telos.

Such unity necessarily eludes us in

life, in language, in narrative. Until the possible cyclical unity of ''birthmark
deathmark" (M 267) in death, each must endure the irony of the quest, and
the compromised solution it offers.
The novel's ending is not wholly optimistic, but perhaps the characters
have escaped the rigidity of their delusive quest sufficiently enough to be able
to continue on, perhaps to wander toward home. Neary has abandoned the
antinomies of "figure and ground" in favor of the view that "Life is all rather
26 The circle with an absent center recalls the picture Watt sees in Erskine's room: "a circle and its
centre in search of each other" (W 129). For a detailed analysis of the picture and Watt's apprehension
of it, see my discussion of Watt below.
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irregular" (M 271), and his illegal marriage has been undone by his second
wife's suicide. Wylie persists in his self-absorbed behavior, but hints that he
will return to Miss Counihan and her plans to "return to the dear land of our
birth" (M 272). Cooper finally feels that something has "set him free" (M
273), and he is finally able to sit down and to uncover his head. Celia has

experienced a distasteful return to prostitution, but we find in the novel's
final section that she has another vision of the Irish sky, and she has
embraced the toil "up the wide hill" as the shortest "way home." (M 282).27
Nonetheless, this physical dissemination provides at best a problematic
resolution to Murphy's desire for a telos expressed in the opening of the
novel, his "wandering to find home" (M 4). This wandering indicates both
the lack of a fixed presence and a desire for that presence. Murphy cannot be
the median, or the means to an end, or even the end itself (the center?)
because he is both absent and unable to be fixed: he attempts to exile himself
from his body and the physical world just as he has exiled himself from
Ireland. Celia comes to understand this; she notes "I was the last exile." and
says she feels that she is "a part out of him" (M 234). The narrator hints at
this when Miss Counihan grasps the "key exiled[ ... ] from her bosom" (M

27

Other critics have offered less optimistic views of the novel's end. For example, John Pilling, in

Samuel Beckett,, asserts that Murphy's death is "the only meaningful centre," whereas the others
[Celia, Neary, et al.] remain hopelessly scattered on the circumference" (33-34).
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219).28 Murphy has been described as a "key" (that would hopefully open
Miss Counihan to Neary), and the cleavage of the exile from the maternal
breast implies the very essence of the exile.29 The recognition is that we are
all always already exiles, and fixity remains elusive. We may only,

li~e

the

exiled signifier, wander along in search of a home. The wandering itself, like
the play of language, must embrace continuous movement: any abortive
attempts at stasis only disrupt the chance to reach the end.
The functioning of language in the novel repeatedly stresses the
problem of mediation.

We find that accounts given by various characters

have been "expurgated, accelerated, improved and reduced."30 The story has
been irremediably altered by the changes that have been made. By
foregrounding the transformation inherent in the use of language, the text
itself reminds us that language cannot convey a self-identical presence. The
narrator indeed emphasizes the foibles and materiality of his own language.

Miss Counihan, "who does not confuse her self with her body" (M 217), is associated with
corporeality throughout the novel. Sylvie Debevec Henning asserts that the character is derived from
"Cathleen ni Hoolihan, the traditional symbol of Ireland and heroine of Yeats' play by that name.
She appears also as the corporeal double of Celia's more complex (Irish) femininity (Beckett's Critical
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Complicity 204).
Ihab Hassan finds the Beckettian hero a quintessential example of Henry Miller's belief that all
exiles "exile themselves from the world's body, the mother's flesh"(The Dismemberment of Orpheus

29

213).

The phrase describes stories related by Celia (p. 12), Neary (p. 48), and Cooper (p. 119). We cannot,
however, determine whether the statements of the former two are alteration of the accounts ostensibly
given by the characters, or whether the narrator has merely transcribed them. Such an indeterminacy
marks an inherent gap in the use of iterable (transmissible) language. In Cooper's case, however, we can
be fairly certain that the account has been altered, given Cooper's status as an "analphabete," and
therefore the laborious, rough-hewn nature of his diction.

30
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He describes Murphy bound to his rocking-chair: "Seven scarves held him in
position." Yet he then enumerates only six scarves (M 2). We must be made
aware of language as the possibility of a lie, or as the site of an oversight, in
which some facet of Murphy's experience has escaped transmission or has
been altered.
Unreliability remains pervasive as the narrator continually
emphasizes the artificial construct of the text (with its own superimposed
boundaries). For instance, he disrupts the traditional pattern of fictional
narrative by mentioning that Murphy's mental life is "as described in section
six" (M 2). And he calls attention to the story (qua story-as-fiction) when
describing Murphy's inability to conjure up images of creatures, even those
"that belong to even worse stories than this" (M 251). Another narratorial
comment dramatically points to the material presentation of language:
"M.M.M. stood suddenly for music, MUSIC, MUSIC in brilliant, brevier and
canon, or some such typographical scream, if the gentle compositor would be
so friendly" (M 236). If we are aware of the materiality of language and the
transformations and play of signification inherent in its workings, then we do
not fall into the trap that makes us believe in the effacement of the signifier,
the presumed closure of some final truth.31

Derrida notes that the metaphysics of presence and its assertion of transcendent "truths" relies on
the belief that the signifier can be effaced. See Of Grammatology, p.20ff.
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Likewise, the novel emphasizes the incapacity of words to describe
mental experience: in his mind, Murphy experiences "such pleasure that
pleasure was not the word" (M 2, 112-13). The narrator, describing Murphy's
mind, states,
Happily we need not concern ourselves with this apparatus
as it really was-that would be an extravagance and an
impertinence-but solely with what it felt and pictured itself
to be. (M 107)
Since the way "it really was" is "an extravagance" we see that, within the
confines of language, nothingness need not be enclosed and re-presented. All
we have is the division inherent of self picturing self, writing reading itself.
Indeed, this perceiving "self" is itself suspect, and exists here solely through
the account of an unreliable narrator. There is no originary presence
available: all we have is an originary trace.32 The signifier cannot be effaced,
but there exists no need to efface it if we understand signification as the
process constitutive of meaning.
The narrator's insistence on "keywords" provides further ironic
disruption of the conventional illusion that words mediate some greater
truth. Language proves itself to be a "coming and going," a

Sylvie Henning, in Beckett's Critical Complicity, makes a similar point of the mind's division from
itself through the necessity of language (65). Derrida, in Positions, explains that "the subject is
constituted only in being divided from itself, in becoming space, in temporizing, in deferral" (29). Thus,
there is no "in-different being" (28). Also see Derrida's "Freud and the Scene of Writing," in Writing
and Difference, for explanations of the mind as trace rather than self-identical whole.
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generated/generative system of differences, rather than a key that can unlock
an enclosed meaning. In one instance, Murphy defrauds his waitress for an
extra third of a cup of tea by maintaining "they have been too generous with
the cowjuice" (M 83). The narrator remarks:
Generous and cowjuice were the keywords here. No
waitress could hold out against their mingled overtones of
gratitude and mammary organs. And Vera was essentially a
waitress. (M 83)
This scene plays on the punning nature of language, the complex division of
signified and signifier that enables "mingled overtones." This is clearly a
facetious and exaggerated case which underscores the impossibility of words
to truly be "key" (i.e., to be that which unlocks a self-identical incontrovertible
meaning). The narrator offers a rather feeble rationalization-Murphy's use
of "cowjuice" is "key" due to its maternal connotations, but the use of the
more obvious choice, "milk," would seem to render a more strongly
maternal connotation. That Murphy uses such a misplaced, uncharacteristic
colloquialism indicates that the narrator's comments are ironic. And the
narrator's assertion that "Vera was essentially a waitress" implies sardonically
that truth (from the Latin verax) merely serves rhetorical manipulations such
as the centering of certain words as "key."33
33 Following Murphy's scam, the narrator addresses the reader, "Try it sometime, gentle skimmer." (M
84), an ironic rendering of the "gentle reader" addresses common to the Realist novel. "Skimmer"
connects Murphy's graft, the milk imagery, and the reading process: the medium of language is fertile
ground on which one may seek advantage through misrepresentations or misconstructions. In "Dante...
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Signifiying systems other than language likewise seem to present their
own problems. There appears no system in which we can read a transcendent
truth. Stars, for instance, prove to be a poor mediator:
Murphy could not help feeling that his stars had been guilty of some
redundance, and that once go-between [as his proposed career] had
been ordained, further specification was superfluous. (M 76)
Murphy thus becomes dissatisfied with the system of stars:
He had been projected, larval and dark on the sky of that regrettable
hour [of his birth] as on a screen, magnified and clarified into his
own meaning. But it was his meaning. (M 183)
The stars fail because they are presumed to be the site of an originary
presence, either their own or an inscription of the presence of "his meaning."
The body also, when read as text, appears as a failed medium:
Murphy looks in Mr. Endon's eyes and sees "the filigree of veins like the
Lord's Prayer on a toenail and in the cornea, horribly reduced, obscured, and
distorted, his own image" (M 249). One body cannot be inscribed on another,
and the echoes of "his own image," taunt us with what a poor replication of
God we humans are. We want to be the embodiment of an originary,
transcendent presence; as a result, we are disheartened to find only sign-assupplement.
Another text is apparently presented at Murphy's death. The shroud is
Bruno. Vico ... Joyce.," Beckett berates readers on their inability to receive Joyce's Work in Progress
[later Finnegan's WakeJ: "The rapid skimming and absorption of scant cream of sense is make possible
by what I may call a continual process of intellectual salivation" (Disjecta 26; my italics).

26

in "folio" (M 263) and "octavo" (M 264). If the shroud is a text, we may
consider it a poorly mediating text just like any other, because Murphy's
death- the product of "superfine chaos"- is left ambiguous, and cannot
transmit itself clearly. The shroud has a burn mark, and is folded (in, folio
and octavo) back on itelf. How are we to read this "act" in the play of
Murphy's life? Although science tries to foist a meaning on the "irrefragable
post-mortem appearance" (M 261), we must recognize that nothing is
irrefragable; life is chaos, language is a coming and going, and indeterminacy
reigns. Even the apparent unity of ''birthmark deathmark" is rendered
problematic (M 267). The seemingly ultimate absence of death retains a trace:
the absence is identified by the "extensive capillary angioma of most unusual
situation" that marked Murphy's imperfect presence on this earth (M 266).
In spite of its gaps, the circle remains: we become increasingly aware of the
limitations of systems such as science and language, but we are thrust back
into the system to fill and mark the gap of nothing as something. As
Murphy's ashes are disseminated, we must resign ourselves to the process
that continues, rather than attempt a closure.34
Pure, immediate mediation is impossible, then, because the world is

Derrida's remark on reading is elucidative for reading Murphy's death (and all the other "texts"
presented for our reading): "the semantic horizon that habitually governs the notion of communication
is exceeded or split by the intervention of writing, that is, by a dissemination irreducible to polysemy.
Writing is read; it is not the site, 'in the last instance,' of a hermeneutic deciphering, the decoding of a
meaning or truth" (Of Grammatology 195).
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comprised of irreducible surds. We learn that "Murphy had such an
irrational heart that no physician could get at the root of it" (M 3). The
problem of the surd is inextricably tied to existence from the point at which
one falls into the world. At Murphy's delivery, the physician

record~

that,

among all the cries of millions of babies, "the infant Murphy's alone was off
the note" of "the proper A of international concert pitch" (M 71). However,
the ironically described "honest obstetrician, a devout member of the old
Dublin Orchestral Society," posits a unison of crying that itself cannot be
verified; not all other babies necessarily conform. He merely asserts a
personally satisfactory version of order and unity in the face of irreducibility.
Such surds remain omnipresent onward to the point of death. The "old boy"
at Miss Carridge's boarding-house commits suicide, leaving "meanders of
blood on her expensive lino" (M 134). When we come to Murphy's thought
of "Descartes linoleum" (M 140), we realize that the chaos of life does not fit
into binary oppositions such as Cartesian dualism.35 When the narrator
remarks, 'What but an imperfect sense of humour could have made such a

All such attempts to reduce the irrationality of chaos or to peremptorily make assumptions
regarding the unknown lead to an inherent falsification. The reduction of surds to fit the order of a
system is also emphasized in Watt, p. 34-5: Watt hears verses sung of endlessly repeating decimals,
such as "Fifty two point two eight five seven one four ...." Rubin Rabinovitz, in The Development of
Samuel Beckett's Fiction (135), explains that the two verses include the number of weeks in a year and
in a leap year, respectively. The numbers stretch on to infinity, thus defying closure. The human
system of time leaves a gap open in the revolution of the natural cycle. The constructions of leap years
and calendar weeks serve a practical purpose, but such systems should not be embraced as
representations of truth about natural reality.
35
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mess of chaos. In the beginning was the pun. And so on." (M 65), we may
presume that some systematizing principle governs this chaos, but it is
imperfect and absent. The gaps inherent in systems such as language are
originary imperfections; such gaps may not allow for closure, but they leave
room for surds.
By contrast, all attempts to enclose or confine meaning are doomed to
fail, doomed, doomed to fail: such enclosures only mark self-serving
falsifications masquerading as truth or illumination: Miss Carridge, Dr.
Killiecrankie, the chandlers, and Wylie all serve a false illumination in their
attempts to enclose meaning. Murphy notes that unity is "exempt from the
big world's precocious ejaculations of thought, word and deed" (M 184). Such
unity is absent among chaos and surds in life, in the coming and going of
language. Attempts to enclose meaning are abortive, falsifying dead ends in
the quest for origin: they foist "facts" (rather than self-acknowledged
supplements) in the space of the absence. As Murphy notes, the "men,
women, and children of science" are merely self-professed "illuminati,"
engaged in "kneeling to their facts." (177) This is the worship of a false idol in
the absence of the Word.
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The narration of the novel itself parodies such "kneeling to facts" through its absurd attention to
time and place (discussed above). Linda Ben-Zvi explains that the exhaustive inclusion of absurdly
detailed, irrelevant facts in the narration indicates "how easily facts suffice for truth in life" (Samuel
Beckett 45). Each of the "illuminati" discussed here certainly confuses facts with truth.
36
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Miss Carridge, whose name implies the miscarriage of truth when one
foists her own meaning, is one example.37 She precociously "ejaculated" an
exclamation of happiness to Celia before she realizes the "catch" that Celia's
proposal entails (M 146). Her reconstruction of the old boy's "pathetic and
tedious" death scene becomes lively due to the "cupidity lending wings to her
imagination" (M 144). Fearful that the truth of the gory suicide will prevent
her from finding another tenant, she tries to avoid scandal for her boardinghouse by claiming the old boy had a "seizure," which, the narrator tells us, is
"Pronounced on the analogy of manure" (M 145). We are given a humorous
portrayal of her bullshit/manure story, in which the superfluous seizure
details and shades of slapstick comedy ("He falls on his face") undercut any
possibility of taking her seriously. Our evaluation of this miscarriage is
further enhanced by the narratorial comments, "Lies.[ ... ] All lies." (M 145),
that are suffused throughout Miss Carridge's account. She also uses
"onomatopoeia with dumb show" in her rendering of the old boy's death (M
145). Such an apparent effacement of the signifier, a seemingly more
immediate mediation, pretends to portray truth, but Miss Carridge merely

In an earlier scene, Beckett presents a fine twist on the term as Murphy finds a "miscarriage of his
tribute" when Celia refuses his insinuation that she resume prostitution (M 20). Celia's discussion
with Mr. Kelly exposes the "tribute" as a formulaic ruse in Murphy's attempt to persuade her. Thus the
real miscarriage is Murphy's feigned indignance when Celia sees the real meaning in his insinuation of
"filthy intelligence." Additionally, the more obvious association with fetal miscarriage provides a
strong image of the failure of becoming/ signifying-into-being.

37
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suppresses meanings that will inconvenience her.
The chandlers also fail to deal with surds. As Murphy encounters
them while job-hunting, they are rudely dismissive, and merely mock him in
terms of what "'e ain't'' (M 77). Confronted with various means of
expressing this disdain, Murphy feels "its content was one: 'Thou surd!"' (M
77). The chandlers, with candle connotations derived in their name, as well
as Miss Carridge, who reads "The Candle of Vision, by George Russell (A.E.)"
(M 155), are associated with the fact-foisting embraced by the "illuminati."

A man of science, Dr. Killiecrankie, also presumptively foists a
meaning on irreducible surds. We learn that, under his domain, "There were
no facts in the M.M.M. except those sanctioned by the doctor" (M 155). And
at Murphy's death, we find that "words never failed Dr. Killiecrankie" (M
262), who is able to positively determine Murphy's death by shock, dismissing
(as does the coroner) other possible causes. Yet we can be sure, just as patients
are jostled to ease the doctor's explanations at death in the M.M.M. (M
156)-and Murphy's remains are "just within my [the coroner's] county" (M
260)- we may presume that he has altered facts in his own favor, perhaps to
get a coroner who will conduct a less demanding inquest. Yet all are
presented as facts of "the irrefragable post-mortem appearance" (M 261).
Thus facts masquerading as presence cannot be accepted.
Wylie also appears as one who can make words lie like the truth,
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presenting fiction as transcendent perfection. His "ravenous eyes" (M 233)
that desire light, along with his self-professed status as the voice "of Reason
and Philautia" (M 216), associate him with the "illuminati" and reveal his
driving self-interest. A fine precursor to our contemporary

sound-b~te

merchants, he prolifically tosses out axioms in a casual attempt to
"nothingness in words enclose." Some examples are his reiterated phrases,
"Humanity is a well with two buckets" (M 58), "For every symptom that is
eased, another is made worse. The horse leech's daughter is a closed system.
Her quantum of wantum cannot vary" (M 57, 200). Although he does not
absolutely quantify it, he boldly "metes want with a span" by asserting that the
span is unvarying. And he assesses the sum of the world's woes: the sum
always evens out at zero, since the positives and the negatives of the two
buckets make all symptoms cancel each other out. Furthermore, he has
determined that the weight of absence is precisely demarcated in the form of
Murphy, to whom he refers as "the absentee." (M 213)38 Such misformed,
self-serving assertions, by masquerading as truths, drive the characters on
delusory searches. When one can participate in the play of language with an
awareness of its foibles, its inherent capacity for untruths, one avoids such
"precocious ejaculations of thought, word and deed," the presumptuous
38 Wylie later speaks of "Mrs. M" and the effect on her by "the protracted absence of her young, her

ambitious husband" (M 228). We later learn that Celia is not Mrs. Murphy (M 268), and Murphy's lack
of ambition is stressed in his desire to avoid a job.
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assertion of an end. Thus opened is the process by which one toils toward the
end that seems always on the horizon.
Even Murphy, who acknowledges surds, persists in "precocious
ejaculations" of language to delineate fixed cateories of being; he falls into the
trap of the "illuminati." This occurs most clearly when he demonstrates a
belief in the presence of ideals: he feels that nothing appears in the outside
world that does not first exist within the sphere of his mind (M 107). The
inside forms are ''beatific idols," while the outside correspondents are merely
"occasions of fiasco" (M 178). Murphy recalls the Occasionalism of Arnold
Geulincx: "Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis [Want nothing where you are
worth nothing]" (M 178).39 "But it was not enough to want nothing where
he was worth nothing" (M 179). He continues to be divided between the
little world and the big world. Problems arise in Murphy's formulation: the
patients at Magdalen Mental Mercyseat, whose psychoses make them appear
to Murphy as "escaped from a colossal fiasco" of the big world (M 178), still
express pains. "The frequent expressions apparently of pain, rage, despair and
in fact all the usual, to which some patients gave vent, suggesting a fly
somewhere in the ointment of the Microcosmos, Murphy either disregarded
or muted to mean what he wanted" (M 179). Murphy, dealing in a brand of
negative theology, can twist facts to suit his own desires for the little world
39

The translation is from Rabinovitz, p.9.
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just as the "illuminati" twist facts to suit their own needs in the big world.
He also determines his priority when he forsakes astrology and the
determinations of the big world: "They were his stars, he was the prior
system." (M 183). Yet he cannot be the prior system, since his death does not
signal the end of the novel (and of the whole "outside" system). Rather, the
dissemination of "the body, mind, and soul of Murphy" ("freely distributed")
(M 275) demonstrates the freedom one obtains, and the true unification in
death that eludes presumptuous categorization of fixity in life ("the big
world's precocious ejaculations of thought, word, and deed" [184]).
And yet Murphy's words betray themselves as fiction and assert their
own materiality. Thus one must look through the play of words for a
meaning; one must view the veil with its tears rather than seek a removal of
the veil of language that uncovers a meaning. Such a phenomenon occurs in
Celia's perception of a conversation with Murphy:
She felt, as she felt so often with Murphy, spattered with
words that went dead as soon as they sounded; each word
obliterated, before it had time to make sense, by the word
that came next; so that in the end she did not know what had
been said. It was like difficult music heard for the first time. (M 40)
The addition of words, the proliferation of the system of differance, defers
meaning along the chain of signifiers, thereby rending the possibility of a
meaning that can be unified with each successive word. That the words seem
to go "dead" implies that meaning is subsumed into the context. Celia will
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need to grasp the system of "difficult music'' before she can understand the
life that is not self-identical within each obliterated word. The "life" of
meaning, with its problematic tie to the signifier (just as Murphy has trouble
reconciling the problematic link between the life in his mind and his body) is
caught up in an endless (with Beckett's penchant for repetition) cycle of death
and rebirth (a rebirth that is decidedly not immaculate), wandering and
waiting for the end. And Murphy, hoping for the peace of the end, believes
such a cycle of resurrection is a mistake.40
Murphy's most significant use of language fills and marks the void
between himself and Mr. Endon. He blurts out staccato phrases, altering the
language, forming a repetition into newness, creating some sort of revelation.
That he is a "mote in Mr. Endon's unseen" shows him the disjunction that
parodoxically retains an inexorable link in the relationship of form (morph,
Murphy) and the "within" (endon).41 The gulf is not crossed, and it is not

Murphy believes that the patients at M.M.M. can achieve an isolation (out of a social context) that
promotes a peace of the end: "Left in peace, they would have been as happy as Larry, short for
Lazarus, whose raising seemed to Murphy perhaps the one occasion on which the Messiah had
overstepped the mark" (M 180). We yearn for the perfection of Christ's resurrection, the unity
embodied by his place in the Trinity, yet we find in our own life cycles, in our own repetitions of words,
the imperfect renewal into Lazarus/Larry, the fallen being of the "nothing new." Murphy seeks escape,
and thus seeking "the means to an end," he denies the rebirth of a means to a continued means, a sense of
newness in one's "toiling among the nothing new." He laments his imperfect birth, and desires a means
to have his rocking chair move "faster and faster and then stop" (M 9, 253), rather than "hobble toward
the only possible." The association of Murphy with Christ, along with his inability (he attempts to
conjure images "In vain" [M 251)) to represent a world to himself, to mediate or re-create, underscores
the fact that this perfection is impossible.
41 Numerous other critics have noted the morph/ endon connection. For example, see Rabinovitz, pp. 92,
97.
40
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removed, but he has outlined the terms of relation. Murphy cannot reach the
core of chaos, but he can grasp the "imperfect sense of humor" that makes
"such a mess of chaos," and that will enable him to find a place in the chaos.
Yet he continues his reach for transcendence, for the Christlike removal of
the gulf. As a result, "superfine chaos" engulfs Murphy and makes him one
with the mess.
Another contrast to the fact-foisting of the "illuminati" is the
unscientific inquiry into the liminal realm. Mr. Kelly seeks this limen while
flying his kite:
Now he could measure the distance from the unseen to the
seen, now he was in a position to determine the point at
which seen and unseen met. It would be an unscientific
observation, so many and so fitful were the imponderables
involved. (M 280; emphasis added)
The goal of his project, however, remains elusive: the string snaps, and "[t)he
end of the line skimmed the water, jerked upward in a wild whirl, vanished
joyfully in the dusk" (M 282). Yet the result is not a defeat, rather the
engagement in this process has enabled a joyful parturition in which the kite,
released from its tether, has escaped the "ludicrous fever of toys struggling
skyward" (M 281). We witness not a dolorous exile, but the escape from the
confinements of an absurd misdirection. The kite that seeks the liminal
realm need not pertain to seen or unseen; it can wander among them,
vanishing to perhaps reappear.

Earlier, Celia had noted kites in the distance
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("She could just discern them")-"specks against the east," which appear
"motionless and black, in a glade of limpid viridescent sky" (M 152). The
kites appear to be an example of Neary's figure and ground, yet when reeled
in, they demonstrate a more chaotic motion. One only finds the

ilh~sion

of

peace and stasis, but embracing the freedom of the play of these "toys," (and,
as I have also indicated, of the play of language) enables a wandering toward
home.
When language is viewed as a tool of signification rather than as a
vehicle for transcendent truths, it may be twisted to suit self-interest, but
wrongs may be righted because the debate remains open. For instance,
Murphy and Celia discuss his horoscope and their impending separation:
'How can you be such a fool and a brute,' she said,
and did not bother to finish.
'But you wouldn't have me go against the diagram,'
said Murphy, 'surely to God.'
'A fool and a brute,' she said.
'Surely that is rather severe,' said Murphy.
' You tell me to get this ... this ... '
'Corpus of deterrents,' said Murphy.
'So that we can be together, and you go and twist it into a ...
into a ... '
'Separation order,' said Murphy. Few minds were better
concocted than this native's. (M 34)
She cannot find words rapidly enough to describe her thoughts, and even if
we are sympathetic to her point of view, Murphy comes out on top because
he is quicker on the draw with language. This point is underscored by the
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humor of the narratorial comment, the reference back to Suk's prophecy.
However, Celia is not defeated, and the two are not separated at this point.
Murphy even accedes to getting a job, and the two remain together
throughout his half-hearted search. The occasional confluences (among the
sundering) occurring in an ongoing process provide a preferable alternative
to the division necessitated by closure.
The system of binary oppositions further breaks down as the gap or gulf
between characters in the novel resolutely asserts a material form (the filling
and marking of the determined lack). For instance, when Celia meets with
Neary, Miss Counihan, and Wylie for the first time, she sits on the edge of the
bed so that "Murphy's half of the bed is between her and them" (M 231). The
four seek "a formula, a status quo agreeable to all" (M 233). Yet the formula
imposed cannot be accurate: the three insist on calling Celia "Mrs. Murphy,"
although we find out she merely "would have been Mrs. Murphy" (M 268;
emphasis added), and they consider themselves Murphy's "very dear friends"
(M 267), but only Celia knows him well enough to identify his body (M 266).
The nature of coming and going within this liminal area is emphasized by
the fact that the bed is the site of meeting and parting, the central piece in the
room "where Murphy and Celia had met and parted so often" (M 227).
Neither presence nor absolute absence asserts itself: only supplement
remains.

The material marking of Murphy's absence is the site of flux, not
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fixity, and only this recognition may enable the other characters to avoid
foisting a presence in the space of this absence. Previously, in the erasure of
some signifier of Murphy, the other characers had been unable to resist
transforming him into some notion of "key," or "end," or other transcendent
presence. They had made him into "the beginning of new life for them all,[ ..
.]the end of darkness for all concerned" (M 130).
A similar occurrence appears in the final exchange between Celia and
Miss Carridge: "A long look of fellow-feeling filled the space between them,
with calm, pity and a touch of contempt. They leaned against it as against a
solid wall of wool and looked at each other across it. Then they continued on
their ways ..." (M 231). The wall of wool invites an association with Christ
(the Lamb of God) as the only bridge for a gulf.42 The problematic, incomplete
division of self from self, self from other, meaning from sign, signifier from
signified, can only be marked and filled by a supplement.43 We lean on the
supplement, longing for it as true presence, as the only redeeming,
immaculately incarnate Word of God that will lead us to Paradise, lead us
The incarnation of Christ introduces to the world the powers of God the Father. As in Murphy's
musings on chaos/ gas, "only God," through his decree "Let there be Heaven in the midst of the waters,
let it divide the waters from the waters," can introduce a metaphysical presence (M 176). The
associations of Murphy and Watt with Christ emphasize the nature of their respective quests, and
underscore the fact that mere humans may not attain this goal.
43 Another notable case is Murphy's last scene with Mr. Endon, in which Murphy feels the enormity of
the gulf between them, even though the gulf physically appears as "the merest hand's-breath of air"
(M 248). Murphy, "who did not speak at all in the ordinary way unless spoken to" (M 250), attempts to
fill the gap with language, in four outbursts that simultaneously delineate the two men's relationship
and lament their absence of a relationship.
42
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home.

*

*

*

*

*

Once inside/outside is forsaken, process (of language/life/quest, etc.)
must be embraced. Murphy's rocking chair "recreation" (M 31) is his only
means for solace since he is incapable "of renouncing all that lay outside" (M
179): it is the recognition of surds, of the irreducibility of existence into an
oppostion of inside/ outside. The chair is the site of oscillation, a back-andforth, within which one finds "a flux of form, a perpetual coming together
and falling asunder" in the dark zone of the mind (M 112).
Celia's experience in Murphy's chair reinforces the connections
between the chair and the workings of language. She finds in the chair a
"silence not of vacuum but of plenum" (M 148). The nothingness exists not
as void, but within supplementarity, the "plenum" which fills and marks a
determined lack. And we find that she experiences a continual unweaving
and reweaving of events that embraces the movement and process of

diffirance in language, of the continual chain of signification: "Penelope's
curriculum was reversed, the next day and the next it was to do all over
again" (M 149). The circularity is acceptable as part of the ongoing process.
She embraces a loose weaving (that will presumably necessitate further
unraveling and reweaving); "the coils of her lif are merely "hackled into tow"
(M 149), made a manageable conglomeration, rather than solidly bound into
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a presumptuous fixity. Language is not denied, but affirmed. Murphy's chair
ritual remains detached from life, ineffable: it evokes a sensation that is "so
pleasant that pleasant was not the word" (M 112). Celia, however,
experiences "a most pleasant sensation." (M 149). The nature of process
inherent in her experience of the chair and in one's involvement in language
includes a recognition of the inability of closure, and thus the disclaimer of
the determined lack need not be asserted. Rigidity is denied: the process
entails that "the days and places and things were untwisted and scattered" (M
149). This resembles Derrida's concept of dissemination, in that it is both a

scattering of undoing and a sowing that enables "generative multiplicity,"
further participation in the process.44 One must, like Celia, accept the given
materials, the "old credentials," and partake in the cycle. The process may be
continued indefinitely before one may "lie down in the paradisal innocence"
(M 149). At the end of the novel, she still must participate in a continuing
process, just as we are all enmeshed in the continual process of language: she
toils "up the wide hill," because there is "no shorter way home" (M 282). The
alternative is a self-absorbed run to the bank in the name of ''Reason and
Philautia," (like Wylie), or a premature abandonment of the world (like
Murphy), in which one, although freely scattered, still obeys the rules of a
44 Derrida notes that "dissemination" plays on both seme and semen, and thus marks "an irreducible
and generative multiplicity. The supplement and the turbulence of a certain lack fracture the limit of
the text, forbidding an exhaustive and closed formalization of it" (Positions 45).
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game (Murphy's ashes follow the conventions of football precisely even in
their non-Newtonian motion).
Like the purgatory of Murphy's "Belacqua fantasy" (M 78), language is
a continually revolving process in which one participates "from the
spermarium to the crematorium" (M 78). Language continues in the circular
play of signification, which promotes constant movement along the chain,
always enabling the repetition that brings it back upon itself. Belacqua
watches "the dayspring run through its [circular] zodiac, before the toil up hill
to Paradise" (M 78).45 No moment of transition signals the end of the cycle,
and the horizon of Paradise is deferred, but the end is in sight. Similarly, one
continues wandering on through the circular play of language that defers
meaning, but the words do not enclose. Always already inherent in the
continual sundering and reconciliation, the coming and going of language,
are the interstices that reveal a glimpse of that elusive thing (home, meaning,
Paradise, Nothingness) Beckett seeks behind the veil. Wandering continues,

The novel's thirteen sections may refer to the twelve signs of the zodiac, then the following section,
the break in this circle, in which the toil uphill is made. In this model, indeterminacy still reigns, no
point of origin exists, the centre cannot hold: Murphy's mind, the ostensible center of the system of
hermetic closure of inside/outside, is displaced from the center by the possibility of home (or Paradise)
established in the thirteenth section. A prematurely wrought rigid enclosure would fabricate a center,
thus closing off the possibility of the break from the circle needed for an odd term in the series. The
thirteen may also refer to twelve disciples and Christ: this possibility coupled with the astrological
overtones decenters both metaphysical systems. Thirteen is also, like Murphy's heart, an irreducible
surd of which we cannot get to the root. Despite the attempts of section six, we cannot get to the
"heart" of Murphy. Only when we accept such surds on their own elusive terms can we wander to find
home.
45
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but home is within sight.

Watt: No Longer "Without"
Watt continues the problematic relationship of self to world, and the

novel intensifies the focus on the inability of language to mediate adequately
the attempt to derive meaning from one's experiences. Yet in this novel,
Beckett's central character finds a fuller element of freedom and telos in his
wandering and in the coming and going of language. Watt's quest brings him
to Knoll's house, where his departing predecessor, Arsene, remarks that Watt,
as he himself had done, wishes for a nothingness: he seeks an existence in
which "the little sounds come that demand nothing, ordain nothing, explain
nothing, propound nothing, ... but always simple and indifferent, ... sites of a
stirring beyond coming and going, of a being so light and free that it is as the
being of nothing" (W 39). We may note that the breakdown of difference is
necessary for this "nothing": the coming and going that is the play of

differance must be suppressed.
Arsene later notes that the result will be the desired harmony, unity
with all: ''When in a word he will be in his midst at last, after so many years
spent clinging to the perimeter" (W 41). Like Murphy's "wandering to find
home," Watt's journey is for that central point that is both origin and telos,
the point of rest from the oscillation of coming and going on the circular path
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of life in the outside world.

Yet his quest will ultimately fail because the

inside world betrays the same sense of flux: borders dissolve, fixity eludes us,
and although rest may be possible, telos is deferred. Both Watt and Murphy
find the corning and going of oscillation essential to their respective quests for
a home. Murphy's chair is an "available means" (M 179) toward the
supposed end of fulfillment, but it alone is not quite enough. However,
during the "dead points" (M 252) of the rock, the points at which the rocking
turns back upon itself, Murphy finds himself in the middle, between world
and sky. Watt finds a similar means in the rails of trains and trams, on which
he is "an experienced traveller" (W 20, 21). As Rubin Rabinovitz notes, Watt
"can also be thought of as a wattrnan (a French term for 'tram-driver')" (136).
Watt eventually seeks "The end of the line," but changes from the "nearer
end" to "the further end" (W 244). This represents a turn from a premature
reach for an end to a determination to continue his engagement with the
process, to extend the journey. Although Watt reaches the apparent telos of
the asylum, Sam's final encounter with him ends with Watt still in motion:
"ever he picked himself up and unmurmuring went on, towards his
habitation" (W 213). The wandering continues, but Watt, having
encountered the gap at the end of the line, chooses to oscillate in his own
manner, backwards.

Similarly, Watt eventually switches from reciting his

text "parrot-like" (W 156) to modifying the tale through his own "discretion
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and sense ... and aesthetic judgement" (W 164). By taking an active part in
the process of language, Watt comes to feed on its instabilities and gaps,
thereby avoiding the stultifying effects of encountering events and terms that
don't conform to a rigid system (the problem encountered by Nackybal,
rendered unable to perform his mathematical feats when he encounters
numbers from outside the system of his memorized list [W 190]). Watt's
desire for origin must be discarded in favor of embracing an ongoing process.
The need for this transformation arises from the problematization of Watt's
world.
Inside/ outside antinomies also persist in Watt: At Watt's arrival at
Knott's, "within" and "without" become the terms with which he places
himself, and the process by which Watt crosses the threshold baffles him (W
36). During his stay, he finds that dogs and strangers come to the house "from
outside" (W 91), "the outer world" (W 69). Similarly, when confined at the
train station, Watt thinks of the "external commotion" (W 232) of train
schedules and the bustling that accompanies it in the realm "without'' (W
233, 234).46 The term "without" implies both an exteriority and a lack. In
Many critics, such as Rabinovitz, contend that the novel is divided into the categories of an inside
world and an outside world, much as Murphy held to a "little world" /''big world" model. Raymond
Federman offers a twist on this model with his own tripartite division of a "human" (external) world,
an "heroic" (internal, intellectual) world, and an "insane" world (fourney to Chaos 95-97). In both of
these paradigms Watt's journey inward exposes the incapacity of "normal" modes of thought to deal
with the inside world. However, I find that the novel, rather than asserting the primacy of the
inside, instead establishes such boundaries merely to demonstrate the stultifying effects of confronting
the diversity of experience with habitually conditioned, fixed thought patterns. When language, and
46
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order to meet at the asylum, Sam and Watt must leave the inside of their
mansions and go out to the "little garden" (W 153). The outer world is not
just "the big world" anymore; barriers are collapsing. To meet, the two men
must pass through "the other scum," "through this jocose, this sniggering
muck" (W 153). A (disdainful) dissociation is made: Sam finds himself and
Watt different from the others, but they remain part of the "scum," living
and moving among these peers, if not tied to them. It is a problematic
delineation rather than complete division. Yet dissociation and difference are
not the only prerequisites in the step toward eventual connection. Watt and
Sam achieve a fair measure of connection when they accept the palpability of
the middle ground with its barriers, imperfections, and gaps. It is this middle
ground- an area both of division and of confluence- that language
occupies.
Several events (or perhaps non-events) serve to outline the problem
Watt faces at Knott's house. Three notable examples, particularly troubling to
Watt, are the "fugitive penetration" made by the Galls (the father and son
who tune the piano), Watt's attempts to name a pot in the kitchen, and
circumstances surrounding the dogs (and their presumed owners, the Lynch
clan) who will ostensibly consume the remains of Knott's meals. Numerous
therefore thought as well, are recognized as a coming and going rather than enclosure, freedom is
achieved from the baffling stasis which occurs upon encountering that which does not conform to the
system. Inside and outside worlds may offer some point of reference, but we may not regard them as
absolutes.
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critics have provided detailed analyses of these scenes and of the ways in
which they "reveal problematical aspects of the relationship between
language and reality."47 I therefore will not provide a detailed reading of
these passages. I will instead offer a brief view of the failure of language to
enclose their nothingness, then turn to other passages in the novel that
provide alternate symbols of signification.
The visit of the Galls cannot stay fixed in Watt's mind; he cannot make
any assertions regarding what happened. He is unable to accept "that a thing
that was nothing had happened, with the utmost formal distinctness [... ],
with all the clarity and solidity of something" (W 76). Watt perceives the
events, but he cannot "saddle them with meaning" (W 79).48 As David Hesla
notes, he attempts to "domesticate reality, to lead it about on a leash of
words."49

Yet even as he replays the event in his mind, he cannot affix

words that will stick: language and meaning come and go in a continual flux.
Watt's next tribulation occurs when he cannot affix a name to a pot: "It
resembled a pot, it was almost a pot, but it was not a pot of which one could

Leslie Hill, Beckett's Fiction: In Different Words, p.21. The whole chapter includes elucidative
readings on these and other passages, both in light of Derridean differance,and with an awareness of
connections to womb/maternal/milk imagery.
48 Even furtive attempts at meaning frustrate Watt, as he can neither reconcile nor distinguish between
an "initial meaning," a "meaning evolved," and the "initial absence of meaning" (W 79).
49 David H. Hesla, The Shape of Chaos, p.70.
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say, Pot, pot, and be comforted" (W 81).50 Watt has no difficulty in using the
pot to prepare meals. The problem resides in language: he needs "semantic
succor." (W 83). Although the pot continues to resist a fixed name, Watt fares
somewhat better with arrangements regarding the remains of Knott's meals.
He formulates twelve possibilities, but realizes that others escape him (W 90).
Yet Watt finds no succor, no solution, but merely a facile palliative: ''Not that
for a moment Watt supposed that he had penetrated the forces at play[ ... ].
But he[ ... ] had made a pillow of old words" (W 117). The pillow is merely an
escape, a brief respite, from the quest for meaning. However, by immersing
himself in the middle ground, the area in which language operates, Watt may
perhaps find that language is constitutive of meaning, and that neither fixity
nor escape is necessary.
Watt cannot reach his much-sought succor of fixity, but the alternative
of coming and going presents itself in the midpoints and medians that appear

50 Stephen Connor, Samuel Beckett, pp.33-34, provides an elucidative reading of the repetition in this
passage, a repetition which, through primordial supplementarity, reflects the pot's self-identity: it is
"a repetition of itself." The sign acts as witness to the pot's existence (as Watt witnesses Knott), and
therefore becomes constitutive of its being. He continues with a lucid parallel case of the
interdependence of language and meaning. Eyal Amiran, in his book Wanderings and Home, offers
associations of pot with helmet and head (and, metonymically, person), therefore stressing the interior
microcosm in which Watt's investigations are pursued. Yet he also notes the Aristotelian connection
with Watt's attempt to name it a shield (29-32). Although such a reading is useful, I find the primary
function of the pot to be its resistance to a narrow symbolic reading. We may also attach to "pot" the
connotation of chamber pot (a sense in which the word is used in both Molly and Malone Dies), thereby
allowing this thing to contain its food in all manner of metamorphoses, from the coming of incorporation
to the going of excretion. Like the word that seeks to name the pot, this seemingly self-contained, selfevident entity disseminates and slips from our grasp, resisting our attempts to enclose it.
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in the novel. Although, in the end, they prove limited as connections or
crossing-points, bridges, fences, narrow stretches of trampled grasses, and
even a trampled-on language do serve as points of confluence that direct
something, "perhaps something" between two seemingly isolated monads.
Bridges and fences serve as figures for language in Watt. As both
boundary and connector, they demonstrate the liberating potential and the
entrapping dangers of signification. The fence at the asylum is described as "a
high barbed wire fence, greatly in need of repair, of new wire, of fresh barbs"
(W 156). The poor condition of the fence recalls the bridge from a few pages
before: "a rustic humpbacked bridge, in a state of extreme dilapidation" (W
154). The image of decrepit aging has previously been applied to language:
the "old words, the old credentials." (W 85). Sam and Watt fix the bridge,
"For we were attached, you see, to the little bridge. For without it how should
we have passed from one part of the garden to the other" (W 155). The bridge
enables the connection of Watt and Sam, and thereby enables the novel (and
hence, their presentation to us, their existence). This parallels the use of
language in the quest for silence, for Beckett here lays out the dissatisfaction
with language. He does not overcome his disdain, but rather remains
attached to this little bridge.
Whereas the bridge provides the crossing, the confluence that enables
the demarcation of Watt and Sam, the fence at the asylum is the division that
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provides their separate existence and the possibility of their coming together.
We do not see a regularity of geometry or the rigid encapsulation that marks
binary oppositions: "Now converging, now diverging, these fences presented
a striking irregularity of contour. No fence was party, nor any part of any
fence" (W 156-57). Although discrete entities, the fences are accessible to each
other: a ''bare yard separated the fences" (W 160). This barren ground
perhaps serves as a no-man's land, Hellespont, a nothing, for Beckett.
Perhaps nothing is here because all is a coming and going in this interstitial
area. The fence has holes that make this middle ground accessible, just as
language, in its inability to fix an originary presence, contains a dislocation
that allows the play of signification. Wandering through a hole, it is this
middle ground that Sam tries to understand:
I perceived, beyond all possibility of error, that I was in the
presence of one of those channels or straits described above,
where the limit of my garden, and that of another, followed the
same course ... it was impossible for doubts not to arise, in a
reasonable mind, regarding the sanity of the person responsible
for the lay-out. Continuing my inspection, like one deprived of
his senses, I observed ... Watt'' (W 158-59)51
But then, when he passes through the hole, his senses are "sharpened to ten
or fifteen times their normal acuity" (W 160). However, this is limen as
much as it is limit; the bare yard is the threshold at which Sam's garden
By questioning the sanity of the person responsible for the layout, Sam parallels the thought
expressed in Murphy regarding the "imperfect sense of humour'' that "could make such a mess of chaos"
with things like puns (M 65).
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nearly reaches Watt's garden. Just as language presents the liminal space in
which meaning is created through the force of differance, Watt and Sam
exchange the most pivotal details of Watt's story in this interstitial area.
Rubin Rabinovitz remarks that Watt's "perception of reality is more
acute" at the asylum, due to his turn inward (136). However, Sam, in the
above statement, observes that senses are sharpened in the liminal area. The
repetition of "ten or fifteen" mocks the attempt to quantify the degree, but
this truly is a revelatory experience for Sam. Watt's problems throughout the
novel stem from the categorization of inside/ outside modes of thinking, and
applying these constraints to a reality that resists encapsulation. When his
thoughts and language become more malleable, less rigid, life still buffets him
about, but he is able to move freely. Rabinovitz even asserts that of the two
pictures in Erskine's room, "the abstract painting triumphs over its realistic
counterpart." (157) The problem with the "realistic" painting (which is also
Watt's problem at Knott's) occurs in the attempt to constrain incompatible
perceptions into one mode of representation. A complete retreat inward (of
the sort Rabinovitz finds) only escapes this problem by leaving problematic
situations on the "outside." However, if we view Watt as participating in the
"coming and going," then inside/ outside boundaries dissolve, and Watt truly
is free to access all realms of experience, just as he and Sam move across and
between boundaries at the asylum.
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Such a "coming and going" achieves its clearest physical depiction in
this area between the fences. It is figured as a region of possibility, of
becoming, or meaning: "as though the two fences were but one" (W 162).
Again, boundaries and divisions break down, become indeterminate. This
indeterminacy previously troubled Watt in his attempts to fix the meaning of
the Galls' visit and to tie a name to the pot, whereas the indeterminacy now
enables a reconciliation.

As Sam and Watt walk together in this liminal area,

the description progresses from "And then turning, I turning, and he
turning, ... "-a di vision- to:
And then turning, as one man, we paced back the way we had paced
back the way we had come, I looking whither we were going, and
he looking whence we were coming. And so, up and down, up and
down, we paced between the fences, together again after so long,
and the sun shone bright upon us, and the wind blew wild about us.
To be together again, after so long, who love the sunny wind,
the windy sun, in the sun, in the wind, that is perhaps something,
perhaps something. (W 163)
The scene achieves a poignancy without wallowing in maudlin sentiment.
Sam tells that he and Watt are "very fond of fences, of wire fences, very fond
indeed; not of walls, nor palissades, nor opacious hedges, no; but to all that
limited motion, without limiting vision" (W 158). This condition parallels
signification through language: the system of signs will not allow arbitrary
sounds to convey meaning (a limit to the "motion" of syntax), yet the vision
is unlimited because of the endless syntagmatic combinations of signifiers
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and the continual play of differance. The movement continues, so there can
be no sense of arrival at the presence of meaning. Such a delusory denial of
the continuation of the process leaves one in a bounded area, as attested by
the fence stretching on both sides of the two men, as well as by the further
confinement which appears in the novel.
Later, Watt's confinement at the train station approximates the
boundaries imposed by the fence. Watt is told that, after being let out, he will
be "free to come and go as you please" (W 231), and within the dark room, we
learn, "The problem of vision, as far as Watt was concerned, admitted of only
one solution: the eye open in the dark. The results given by the closed eye
were, in Watt's opinion, most unsatisfactory" (W 232). Watt can accept the
limit to motion, as long as vision is not self-limiting. This is similar to the
freedom of the vision within his mind that Murphy seeks while bound to his
chair. He is fixed to the chair, which rocks in a regular, limited oscillation,
until the whole system topples, leaving him in a "crucified position" (M
28).52

Another figure for language, the flux between chaos and constraint
inherent in signification, is the "jointed unstable thing" Watt ponders. After

52 Again, the Christ-resonances call up an imperfectly rendered Christ who fails to provide the final
solution, the ultimate redemption. The imperfection of man's reach for Christlike redemption is
underscored by Sam's note that Watt appears to him as "the Christ supposed by Bosch" (W 159)- a
representation of Christ rather than an actual presence.
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his "pot" ruminations, Watt hopes that things would appear "in their ancient
guise, and consent to be named, with the time honoured names, and
forgotten."
Things and himself, they had gone with him now for so long, in
the foul weather, and the less foul. Things in the ordinary sense,
and then the emptiness between them, and the high heavy hollow
jointed unstable thing, that trampled down the grasses, and
scattered the sand, in its pursuits." (W 84)
It seems as though Watt asks things to make a ritual self-sacrifice to language,

that the naming is in fact an "execution" of the thing, so that the thing may be
forgotten. This certainly priveleges the notion prevalent in Western
metaphysics that the thing (in its form, idea, or "thingness") is prior to the
word. Watt believes that the representation enacted by naming (he hopes for
words to be applied to his situation; he doesn't care about understanding)
replaces and nullifies the thing. However, in all of Watt's use of language, as
well as in Sam's narration, the material sign of language is as palpable as any
other "thing." Given the phrase, "the high heavy hollow jointed unstable
thing," the alliteration focuses attention on the material sign: the material
connection is as valid as any ineffable containment of the nothingness of the
thing. Since one cannot enclose "nothingness/ in words" one tries to use the
jointed unstable language (whose connections are as precarious as the mere
sharing of an "h" or /h/ sound) to fill the emptiness between things.
I must reiterate that the supplementarity of language does not only fill
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this lack, this emptiness, but marks the lack as well. In marking the
emptiness- by the very "problem" of not being the thing to which it referslanguage emphasizes the nothingness in the gulf between word and thing:
the veil of language is already rent.53
This thing "tramples down the grasses," thus making it analagous to
the bull or boar that violently breaks the fence, yet it is hollow like the
fence(s), which have a "hollow" or gap between them. The diverging and
converging make this thing sometimes seem wide, and sometimes seem no
wider than three-quarters the length of an animal. Also, the "scattered sand"
recalls the dissemination of Murphy's ashes. Among these somewhat
conflicting associations, I must emphasize that the point is not to posit a rigid
paradigm- that would merely be another attempt to enclose "nothingness/
in words"- but rather to demonstrate the associations and the realm of
possibility conveyed by these figures of signification. The emphasis remains
on the hollow and on the movement, rending, and flux that continually
occur in this middle realm. The figure eludes our attempts to form a mental
picture just as differance resists attempts to name and define it. In order to
And this rending may be considered a precondition in the quest for wholeness, home, origin/telos.
''Where there is a reconciliation,[ ... ] there must have been first a sundering" (Ulysses 193); We have
neither present to us: all is a coming and a going. Since we can reach neither beginning nor end, all we
have is the midpoint, an oscillation in purgatory. But in this coming and going that constitutes the
intermediary realm between origin and presence, we view the condition (always already there) of
sundering that anticipates the possibility (however long deferred) of reconciliation. In a similar vein,
W.B. Yeats writes in "Crazy Jane Talks to the Bishop": "nothing can be sole or whole/That has not been
rent."
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include the nothingness, we must accept some discontinuities rather than
attempt rigid closure.
Circle and Centre
The picture of a circle in Erskine's room prompts Watt to ponder the
effects of perspective, fixity, and comings and goings. The following passage
describes his apprehension of the picture:
A circle, obviously described by a compass, and broken at its lowest
point, occupied the middle foreground, of this picture. Was it
receding? Watt had that impression. In the eastern background
appeared a point, or dot. The circumference was black. The point
was blue, but blue! The rest was white. How the effect of perspective
was obtained Watt did not know. But it was obtained. By what
means the illusion of movement in space, and it almost seemed in
time, was given, Watt could not say. But it was given. Watt
wondered how long it would be before the point and circle entered
together on the same plane. Or had they not done so already, or
almost? And was it not rather the circle that was in the background,
and the point that was in the foreground? Watt wondered if they
had sighted each other, or were flying blindly thus, harried by some
force of merely mechanical mutual attraction, or the playthings of
chance. (W 128-29)
That it is "obviously described by a compass" indicates the mechanical
precision with which it attempts to encompass, encircle, contain, or enclose.
The break in the circle renders this attempt incomplete. In this respect the
circle mirrors Watt's own attempts, throughout his stay in Knott's
establishment, to encompass all aspects of a situation or thing by means of
rigorously mechanized and plotted lists of possible permutations. Yet all such
attempts are necessarily incomplete since "nothing changed, in Mr Knott's
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establishment, because nothing remained, and nothing came or went, because
all was a coming and a going" (W 132-33). The picture "represents," in the
most obvious sense, the novel's central scheme of attempt to close the
hermeneutic circle, to enclose "nothingness/ in words."
Circle and centre themselves seem to take on the quality of word and
meaning. The circle is "obviously described" in black on a white background
with all the mechanical assurance of a printed or typed word (the material
sign). Yet the "centre" cannot be fixed: it is "a point, or a dot," and it appears
vaguely somewhere "in the eastern background," an area less prominent, less
present than the circle. This point cannot be fixed physically, nominally, or in
a sense of what "the point" of the painting is, but this boundless possibility is
refreshing to Watt.
Furthermore, the point (or dot) cannot itself be adequately enclosed in
words: it is "blue, but blue!" The repetition provides an attempt of language
(moving circularly back to the original word, or oscillating along a path
broken by the ''but," and moving back to itself) to convey or enclose meaning
through excess. The differentiating conjunction ''but" shows that the first
''blue" did not adequately enclose meaning, and we must add another ''blue,"
which is emphasized through exclamation (thereby indicating some measure
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of sublimity in this celestial color).54 And as a conjunction, "but" may not be
mistaken as the name of something as ''blue" may be taken for the name of a
color or- to cite the example that most troubles Watt-as "pot" may be
confused as the name of the pot. In modifying the second ''blue" through a
connection/ dissociation, the conjunction "but" necessarily glances backwards
at the first ''blue." As such, it appears as a sort of dead point in the
oscillation,55 a point at which the nothingness behind language (and behind
the painting) is seen. This second ''blue" is the same and yet unavoidably
different from the first blue.56 We still cannot fix this point (or dot, or centre).

The description of the painting begins with a certainty ("obviously
described") and deteriorates as it proceeds to examine all the things tied to this
apparent material certainty. Immediately the question arises, ''Was it
receding?" and we are left with the vague, untranslatable "impression,"
"effect of perspective," and "illusion of movement." These apperceptions
cannot be mediated: we must accept them on faith. Similarly, narrator,
54 See Lucky's outburst in Waiting for Godot: "blast hell to heaven so blue still and calm so calm with a
calm which even though intermittent is better than nothing ..." (28b).
55 The "dead point" of oscillation while rocking in his chair enables Murphy, just before his death, to
see himself in the middle, between the world and sky (M 252). A similar case is the consideration in
Watt of the midpoint between coming and going, pleasure and pain, youth and age, at which one
reaches the "hollow" where one is "free, free at last for an instant free at last, nothing at last" (W 201202).
56 The difference appears even more strongly than in the "Murphy was Murphy" tautology I discussed
previously. The conjunction ''but" provides a stronger dissociation than the linking verb "was." The
division supplied by the comma adds to this effect, producing a "jointed, unstable thing."
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reader, and Watt must take a leap of faith by accepting unsubstantiated
assertions: "How... Watt did not know. But it was obtained. By what
means ... , Watt could not say. But it was given" (W 128-29; emphasis added).
This may seem to posit visual art as a more immediate medium than
language, since Watt can accept that his "senses" such as sight provide him
with undeniable (if inexplicable) perceptions that make "sense." However,
Watt may just be able to take the leap of faith because he lacks knowledge of
the medium. He may wonder "what the artist had intended to represent"
because ''Watt knew nothing about painting," and he may hope that centre
and circle are moving "in boundless space, in endless time" because ''Watt
knew nothing about physics" (W 129). Perhaps the excruciating pain caused
by Watt's "need of semantic succor" (W 83) stems from the fact that he is a
"very fair linguist." Perhaps with such knowledge applied to the painting,
Watt would not be able to accept simply the fact ''but it was."
However, even though Watt can accept on faith that perspective and
movement appear, he cannot be certain what these effects show him. He
cannot describe the flux that appears before him, he can merely apprehend its
existence. This is similar to his current view of Knott, about whom Watt can
substantiate little or nothing, but whom he finds to be the principle that
underlines all of Mr Knott's establishment. Watt, though he senses certain
effects at work in the painting, is frustrated (as always) in his quest for both
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an origin and a completion. He wonders if and when the point and circle will
reach the same plane, and he considers, "had they not done so already, or
almost?" (W 129). He cannot fix the positions or temporal movement in
either direction.
Among Watt's many possibilities for centre and circle, one appeals
greatly to him:
at the thought that it was perhaps this, a circle and a centre not its
centre in search of a centre and its circle respectively, in boundless
space, in endless time, then Watt's eyes filled with tears that he
could not stem, and they flowed down his fluted cheeks unchecked,
in a steady flow, refreshing him greatly. (W 129)
This possibly seems to show the center corning home, and the circle becoming
a home for a new center. Thus the point Watt sees is an exiled or lost center
that will finally return home, and the circle is some emptiness (perhaps like
the "empty heart" "empty hands" of the addenda [W 250]) that will be filled.
Watt, however, soon abandons this notion and turns the painting to
various postitions. We are told:
But in these positions the picture pleased Watt less than
it had when on the wall. And the reason for that was perhaps
this, that the breach ceased to be below. And the thought of the
point slipping in from below at last, when it came home at last,
or to its new home, and the thought of the breach open below
perhaps for ever in vain, these thoughts, to please Watt as they did,
required the breach to be below, and nowhere else. It is by the nadir
that we come, said Watt, and it is by the nadir that we go, whatever
that means. And the artist must have felt something of this kind too,
for the circle did not turn, as circles will, but sailed steadfast in its white
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skies, with its patient breach for ever below. (W 131)57
In this situation, Watt does not allow for a second circle and center; he only
imagines a reconciliation between the circle and its estranged center, or a new
pairing of the previously separate circle and center.
Oddly, after Watt runs through a series of contemplations the painting
and its "illusion of movement in space, and it almost seemed in time" (W
130), Sam (we may only surmise it is Sam) offers the following remark:
Watt did not of course wonder all these things at the time,
but some he wondered at the time, and the others subsequently.
But those that he wondered at the time, he again wondered
subsequently, together with those that he did not wonder at the
time, over and over again. And many other things in this connexion
also, of which some at the time, and the others subsequently, Watt
wondered subsequently also, time without number. (W 130)
This remark undermines any illusion of unity or stasis in time for Watt's
contemplation, and we are left with the feeling that there is something
unspoken about Watt's wondering. Again, the narrative highlights its own
incapabilities. ''Watt will not/ abate one jot'' (W 249), yet no story (not even
one written by Proust) can continue on unabated. Furthermore, there exists a
strange dichotomy here of lack and accumulation that underscores the fact
that meaning cannot be fully present in language. We must wonder how
many "things in this connexion" Watt has since pondered, and what the
Birth and sexual connotations in the passage emphasize the sense of union sought between point and
circle. Re-entry through the vaginal "breach," the "nadir" by which we come, suggests a yearning to
return to the womb.
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thoughts, questions, and relieving epiphanies (or, more likely, anxietyproducing anti-epiphanies) comprised his musings. And given for Watt's
penchant for inversion, alternation, and compiling of permutations (not to
mention the fact that his words alternately please and disgust him, so we may
only have the ones consistent with his whims at the time of the telling), we
cannot tell whether any unrelated, unexpressed contemplation retains much
of the tone Watt takes toward his subject here.
Thus we have an episode narrated as though it occurs at a particular
point in time (an interval-perhaps even, arbitrarily, ten or fifteen minutes,
to use a favorite Beckettian span), with Watt's ostensibly unmediated
ruminations on a painting. Yet we now grasp the realization that some
things are necessarily left unsaid (or poorly mediated in the telling), and our
perception is marred by a sense of lack. And we also find the accumulation
that occurs in Watt's mind, a recapitulation that adds to and possibly
transforms the original apperception of the painting. We consequently find
our mediated perspective obfuscated by the residue of subsequent thoughts
and the filthy fingerprints of all who have pawed at and handled this story
before it is summarily dropped in our laps. Watt shows us that we are mired
in this problem in any attempt to relate something to someone, indeed, in all
uses of language.
Throughout the novel, the fundamental wordplay of Watt/what offers

63

us a constant question (reach for meaning), answer (investment of meaning),
and requestioning and reanswering ad infinitum. Watt wonders, ''Was the
picture a fixed and stable member of the edifice?" (W 130). The narrative
denies a fixed answer by offering a peremptory question, an answer "that the
picture was part and parcel of Mr Knott's establishment" (W 130), then the
"question to this answer" (130), then, after a moment's reflexion" (131), Watt's
decision that the picture "was one of a series" (W 131). The novel teases us
with an origin and denies us an origin, because we cannot provide closure to
the beginning or the end of the questioning and answering. All is a coming
and a going. Is the root question the first question or the restructured
question; consequently, how can the answer that precedes the question
answer the question? And how can we accept the answer at which Watt
arrives, if he may continue with another "moment's reflexion"?
The novel teases us by dangling an origin in front of us and
simultaneously denying it. "What" both asserts an origin, a meaning, by
giving us the quiddity of "what'' or "whatness," and it denies an origin by
demanding the interrogative "what?"- a seeming question without direction.
It seems that the novel both asserts "what it is," and asks, "is it what? /it is

what? /what is it?"58
58 I am reminded of the Derridean play on the French sens, which means "sense" (meaning), "sense" (of
sensory input), and "direction." The association here is that Watt tries to reconcile things perceived
through the senses with some sense or meaning, and that I find this eternal "what?" to be "a question
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Watt's inversions divert attention from the sign-as-name (of a
signified presence) to the materiality of signification. At the beginning of
each new transformation, Sam notes that at first the sounds "were devoid of
significance for me" (W 164). Yet in spite of Watt's unfamiliar inversions,
differance still operates, and Sam is able to grasp the system of differences that
delineate each term in the series and to explain the method by which Watt
inverts the sentences, words, or letters. He remarks, "But soon I grew used to
these sounds, and then I understood as well as before" (W 165). We may be
surrounded by "no things but nameless things, no names but thingless
names," as Molloy will lament,59 but we may close our ears to Lear because
something will come from this nothing. Understanding wins out: in the
coming and going of language, meaning is created.

* * * * *
In Murphy and Watt, Beckett develops the theme that permeates most
of his later fiction: the inability of language to rigidly encapsulate the
nothingness and chaos of existence. In the coming and going of language, we
find Beckett's characters in the liminal realm that is neither form nor content,
inside nor outside, signifier nor signified. This paradoxical flux later achieves
its most crystallized articulation in The Unnamable:
without direction" (as above). This recalls my earlier remarks on the "point," which semantically
serves as possible origin (center), indexical marker, or meaning.
59 Molloy, p.31. Molloy goes on to say, "All I know is what the words know," and his
disclaimer /lament is actually descriptive of the liberating process that constitutes meaning.
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without a mouth I'll have said it, I'll have said it inside me,
then in the same breath outside me, perhaps that's what I feel,
an outside and an inside and me in the middle, perhaps that's
what I am, the thing that divides the world in two, on the one
side the outside, on the other the inside, that can be as thin as
foil, I'm neither one side nor the other, I'm in the middle, I'm
the partition, I've two surfaces and no thickness, perhaps that's
what I feel, myself vibrating, I'm the tympanum, on the one
hand the mind, on the other the world, I don't belong to either.
[... ]I'm in words, made of words[ ... ], I'm all these words[ ... ]
those that merge, those that part, those that never meet60
The quest for telos must reach beyond this midpoint, beyond words. Yet
Murphy and Watt, also made of words, cannot reach this point. There is, in
fact, no closed system for them to reach beyond (despite contrary assertions in

Murphy): gaps, errors, and indeterminacy in the texts leave them open, and
the two characters also reappear in the Trilogy.61 And so the two, like all
selves (constructed by language), must toil in the purgatory of language to
retain the glimpse of Paradise.
Writing on a Joycean mode which he terms "purgatorial" fiction,
Samuel Beckett notes that the primary characteristic of such purgatorial
fiction is "the absolute absence of the Absolute."62 Although Beckett broke

The Unnamable. Three Novels, p.383, 386. At this point, amid the coming and going of language,
perhaps one with this flux, the Unnamable perceives the gap at which he may be a "wordless thing in
an empty place" (386). In this character, in this narrative in which the beginning cannot begin and the
ending cannot end, we have the closest glimpse of the origin/telos of Beckett's Nothing.
61 The two are named as part of the rabble of stories in Moran's head in Molloy, p.137 Malone also
names them in Malone Dies, p. 236, and they appear unnamed on pp. 281-282 and elsewhere, implicitly.
In The Unnamable they recur, for example, on pp.293, 303, 305, 391. Certainly Murphy cannot escape
being, as he would say,"the contingent of a contingent."
62 Disjecta, p.33.
60
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from Joyce's omnipotence, his disdain for absolutes prompted him to partake
in such purgatorial fiction, a fitting midpoint. His comments demonstrate
Beckett's penchant for paradox: the very disallowance of the Absolute
necessitates in and of itself an absolute constraint. Beckett loathes the
Absolute in the same manner in which Murphy likes ginger: each man's
preference shackles the free gamut of permutations. This, of course, is a
catch-22 because the intrusion of absolutes is even more prohibitive. Yet the
denial of absolutes affirms the play of differance, and this, we have learned
from Derrida, is a con di ti on for meaning.
Difference and indifference assert their problematic interplay in the
space vacated by the absolute, and this consideration prompts a wordplay on
"indifference."63 Given Derrida's point that difference is necessary to the
production of meaning and constitution of the subject; we may deduce that
the eventual achievement of total indifference is the final retreat into
solipsism, the annihilation of self into self.64 Differance is generative of
differences and therefore "Nothing- no present and in-different being-thus

Leslie Hill's book, in fact, acknowledges this in its subtitle, In Different Words.
Murphy's annihilation by the "superfine chaos" of the gas explosion becomes the only way in which
he can achieve indifference. Just before his death, he had decided to return ''back to Brewery Road, to
Celia" (M 252), thereby succumbing to "his deplorable succeptibility to Celia" that "continued to
divide him" (M 179). Thus he cannot achieve (in life) the "freedom of indifference, the indifference of
freedom" (M 105).
63
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precedes difference and spacing."65 This originary and final Nothing-asabsence is the apparent goal of Beckett's characters. But if this Nothing were
in fact the true goal, then Beckett's work would have ended necessarily with
the gas explosion of Murphy's demise. And the novel therefore would be an
utter failure confronted by a reader whose existence, rather than ending with
Murphy's, would continue to be enmeshed in the play of language.
Therefore, the Nothing-as-something predominates in Beckett's work, which
leaves both characters and readers with fleeting glimpses of possible
transcendence, and which affirms (albeit without enthusiasm) the play of
language. This affirmation appears in the words "I can't go on, I'll go on."66
It is in the space between "I can't go on" and "I'll go on" that we find the

agonized tension that impels continued engagement with language and thus
with the world. The "I can't go on," followed by a comma rather than a
period, doesn't make pretenses to closure, rest, or peace-there isn't even a
peristaltic stop-start. Rather, the former phrase is immediately drawn
forward into the resignation of the latter. Closure is deferred and the reach

65 Positions, p.28. The only possible name for such a being is God, and such transcendence is absent from
language, from the novel. Murphy is replaced for "God" in the epigraph to section six (M 107), yet he
only achieves this indifference later when he is no longer present in the novel. In Watt, the everchanging, indifferent Knott, the "one who neither comes nor goes" (W 57), remains elusive, imperfect,
and described as "needing nothing if not, one, not to need, and two, a witness to his not needing, of
himself knew nothing. And so he needed to be witnessed. Not that he might know, no, but that he
might not cease" (W 203).
66 The Unnamable, p.414.
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for closure is asserted. Beckett, highly aware of seriality,67 will not mistake an
ending for closure. An ending of "I can't go on" would regress to an
infinitude of hell rather than reach closure, whereas the purgatorial "I'll go
on" enables the reach for the ever-distant horizon of Paradise.
Since meaning can only be construed in terms of difference, the
infinite horizon of Beckett's beloved Purgatory can only be enabled by the
ineluctable, ineffable figure of Paradise on that horizon. Our language may be
imperfect and fallen, but its very imperfections enable the construction of
meaning, perhaps even the possibility of redemption.68 Beckett even makes a
reluctant nod at this possibility: in Murphy, he leads us along with Celia and
Mr. Kelly on an uphill toward the horizon of Paradise. It is a toil "into the
teeth of the wind," but it is the shortest way home. At the end of Watt, the
three (wise?) men at the train station view the sunrise (in Watt's absenceperhaps the ineluctable questing/questioning is on sabbatical), and they
assume the hand of God in its creation. Sam/Beckett's ironic tone is heavily
muted in this passage thereby enabling the possibility of the existence of God,
See, for example, the mention of "term[s] in a series," such as men, "the centuries that fall," etc.,
in Watt, p.131. Also, many of Beckett's characters reappear serially throughout his work, and the "M"
protagonists often seem to meld into one. Critics such as Stephen Connor have remarked that the
narrator of The Unnamable may be an "Ur-M," representing, among others, Murphy, Molloy, Moran,
Malone, and Mahood (Samuel Beckett 39).
68 Derrida would argue that language is not "fallen," because a Fall would necessitate an originary
presence from which it had fallen (Positions 53). In this insertion of metaphysical possibilities, I do
not believe my argument falls back on a metaphysics of presence. Beckett's metaphysics only exists as a
possibility that is gestured and only fleetingly and imperfectly revealed: it is not present, and it is
this lack of presence that governs his language and his fiction.
67
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and, at the very least, necessitating the existence of the image of God. It is in
the light of the possibility of an absolute (the final grasp of meaning) that we
take the leap of faith, casting ourselves over the chasm of the determined lack
inherent in language. Beckett, however, leaves us suspended, staring down
at the gaping void, trying to locate the nothingness beneath us. It is at this
point that he places us as motes in the (almost) absolute freedom of the
coming and going of language. And it is here that he accosts us with a wry
smile.
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